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The life sciences are changing at a rapid rate in their fundamental character. 
These changes are of two principal kinds. First, tremendous technical advances 
have been realized over the past couple of decades. It is now possible and, 
indeed, is common practice to transfer genetic material between completely 
dissimilar organisms. It is also possible to isolate and multiply for commercial 
use parts of organisms to, for example, mass-produced chemicals that are 
otherwise produced in much smaller quantities by plants. The second change, 
intimately connected with these scientific breakthroughs, is a strong and 
escalating trend toward the commercialization of the life sciences (Belcher 
and Hawtin 1991).
As a consequence, since the mid-1980s, the main industrialized countries 
have started international negotiations to encourage (or to force) the rest of 
the world to reduce unauthorized diffusion of new technologies. The risk of 
having their intellectual property pirated elsewhere would deter companies 
from exporting their products and technologies. It was concluded that the 
absence of strong intellectual property protection performs as an effective 
trade barrier (Jaffe and van Wijk 1995).
In this context, the protection of biological innovations was introduced in 
the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) talks around 1990, and 
has become the subject of specific provisions in the final agreement. In this 
way, an actual requirement for membership in the World Trade Organization, 
according to the Uruguay Round of GATT, is full adoption of the agreement 
on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs). TRIPs sets
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international standards for protection. Patents shall be available for any 
inventions in all fields of technology. Excluded from patent protection may 
be plants and animals other than microorganisms, and essentially biological 
processes for the production of plants and animals, other than nonbiological 
and microbiological processes. However, protection for plant varieties shall 
be provided either by patents or by an effective sui generis system or by any 
combination thereof (GATT 1994).
TRIPs has brought some peace of mind to those promoting stronger 
protection of intellectual property rights for biological innovations. But a 
concern remains: The access to genetic resources and the possibility of adopting 
a certain degree of control over these resources through different types of 
ownership. Although considerable progress has been made in developing an 
international framework for the conservation, use and access to plant genetic 
resources, it is still unclear if plant genetic resources are subject to ownership.
It is also unclear to what extent developing countries, where an important part 
of biodiversity concentrates, can make actual profits from sovereign rights 
contemplated in the Convention on Biological Diversity. This paper presents 
a perspective from the South to these questions.
FromaFreeFlowSystemtoSovereignty
During the 1970s, the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO) Commission on Plant Genetic Resources was established as an 
intergovernmental policy forum. Although the FAO’s involvement in genetic 
resources dates back several decades, it was in 1983 that member governments 
established the International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources. The 
Undertaking is a nonbinding agreement to cooperate in the conservation 
of genetic material and to work together for its sustainable development. 
Regarding the ownership and control over plant genetic resources, the 
Undertaking declared all germplasm, including breeders’ lines and elite 
varieties, as common heritage. Most developing countries, and many developed 
countries, adhered to the Undertaking, but it had no legal standing. The U.S. 
did not adhere to the Undertaking, even after the modifications made later 
(Menon 1995).
Major changes concerning access to genetic resources have been taking place 
within the Commission. As mentioned before, according to the 1983 FAO 
International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources, common heritage meant 
free access. Article 5 of the Undertaking stated that adhering governments and 
institutions will make genetic resources under their control available “free of 
charge, on the basis of mutual exchange or on mutually agreed terms.” In 1989, 
the Undertaking was modified through the FAO resolution 4.89 on an agreed 
interpretation of the Undertaking including a recognition of breeders’ rights 
and farmers’ rights, and resolution 5.89 on farmers’ rights. Resolution 4.89 
clearly stated that the term “free access” did not mean “free of charge.” The
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last FAO conference, held November 1991, discussed another amendment 
to the Undertaking that endorsed “that nations have sovereign rights over 
their plant genetic resources and that breeders’ lines and farmers’ breeding 
material should only be available at the discretion of their developers during 
the period of development.”
“In other words, in less than a decade, the position had taken a 180 degree 
turn” (Menon 1995). This constitutes the first international agreement to 
recognize States’ sovereign rights with respect to plant genetic resources, 
as clarified by resolution 3.91. Under these last provisions, countries adhering 
to the Undertaking agreed to confer access to the samples of genetic materials 
under their control only for specific purposes, e.g., scientific research, plant 
breeding or conservation. This clearly excludes access with an aim to 
reproducing the materials for commercial purposes, such as for propagating 
seeds (Correa 1994).
Plant Breeders’ Rights, as provided for under UPOV (International Union 
for the Protection of New Plant Varieties) are not incompatible with the 
Undertaking. No reference is made regarding the compatibility of the 
Undertaking with the patenting of plant genetic resources. The granting 
of patent rights implies the restriction on the access to protected materials 
greater than in the case of breeders’ rights. The compatibility of the Undertak-
ing with patent rights is likely to be discussed in the framework of the ongoing 
process of the FAO Commission on Plant Genetic Resources. “Divergence’s of 
opinion may be anticipated, since many developing countries seem to view 
patenting of plants and plant varieties as incompatible with a policy of 
development and sustainable use of plant genetic resources” (Correa, 1994).
The  ConventiononBiologicalDiversityFromRecognitioQWR&RPSHQVDWLRQ
The Convention on Biological Diversity was adopted at the Earth Summit in 
Rio de Janeiro, in June 1992, which was organized to address a broad range of 
environmental problems. The Convention represents an attempt to balance the 
interests of the gene-rich South with those of the gene-poor but technology-rich 
North. In December 1993, the Convention became, unlike the FAO’s Interna-
tional Undertaking, a legally binding framework for conserving and utilizing 
global diversity. It recognizes “national sovereignty” over all genetic resources, 
as well as the need to compensate developing nations for the resources that 
they have historically donated to the development of the world’s agriculture.
The Convention represents an agreement that grants access to those 
resources in exchange for compensation and access to technology. Article 1 
of the Convention describes its objectives. They include conservation of 
biological diversity, sustainable use of its components, fair and equitable 
sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources, 
through (Siebeck 1994):
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Appropriate access to genetic resources;
Appropriate transfer of technologies (taking into account all rights 
over those resources and to technologies); and
Appropriate funding.
Article 3 of the Convention affirms that States have the sovereign right to 
exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies. 
Article 15 addresses access issues and states that the authority to determine 
access to genetic resources rests within the national governments and is subject 
to national legislation. This is elaborated as follows (Mugabe and Ouko 1994):
States shall facilitate access for environmentally sound use;
The access shall be subject to prior informed consent and based on 
mutually agreed terms; and
The Convention provides for the sharing of benefits derived from 
genetic resources with the country of origin, or the country 
providing such resources, if required in accordance with the 
convention.
The right of access by other contracting parties is, thus, dependent upon 
the conditions established by the legislation and competent authorities of each 
country. It is also subject to the country’s prior consent, provided further that 
“mutually agreed terms” are reached between the parties. This effectively 
implies that future transfers of genetic resources will be made under material 
transfer agreements designed to protect source nations’ interests in any 
resulting profits. Under the compromises of the Convention, this international 
sovereign right applies only to genetic resources possessed in in sui collections. 
Resources already outside the nationals as in international repositories, are not 
subject to such rights (Barton 1994).
Another obligation assumed by contracting parties is to provide . .in the 
case of technology subject to patents and other intellectual property rights . . .” 
for an “adequate and effective protection” of said rights (Article 16). This article 
may be read as requiring the patentability of genetic resources, but only defines 
the conditions of protection if and when such a protection is conferred (Correa 
1994).
An obligation is also stated for recipients of genetic resources to allow 
and facilitate access to technologies on mutually agreed terms and limited to 
technologies derived from the use of genetic resources. Intellectual property 
protection, as contemplated in Article 16, limits release of technology. There 
are no provisions for compulsory licensing (Siebeck, 1994). In this way, “the 
Convention, in a provision that is carefully balanced but lacks clear logic, also 
defined a developed-world duty to transfer technologies that are relevant to the 
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity or make use of genetic 
resources. This is to be done in a way consistent with the adequate and effective 
protection of intellectual property rights” (Barton 1994).
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This contradiction regarding the access of developing countries to tech-
nologies of developed countries may have profound implications for the 
former. According to Walter Jaffe (1994), biodiversity offers interesting 
possibilities for introducing new biotechnologies and investments from the 
North, but to capitalize these possibilities developing countries require 
substantial and sophisticated scientific and technological resources. Unless 
developing countries rapidly create such capacities, the exchange with the 
North will take place in a very inequitable way, preventing access by developing 
countries to the technologies they require for sustainable use and conservation 
of their resources.
The financial needs of the Convention will be subscribed to primarily by 
the developed countries. These are to meet developing country expenses on 
conservation, as well as their access to technology. They could be drawn upon 
to pay for royalties. It seems quite wishful to assume that Global Environment 
Facility funds, created for this purpose, will be enough to enable developing 
countries to access the technologies they need to achieve the general objectives 
of the Convention.
It is therefore hard to imagine how national sovereignty over genetic 
resources can be implemented in countries that lack the legal infrastructure 
and, even more critical, that are not even aware of the diversity, quantity, 
location and potential of these resources. Accepting that it has been a major 
step for developing countries to get international recognition of the sovereignty 
and compensation for the value of biological resources, it is essential to keep 
working to improve the legal framework to deal with these issues at all levels 
and to build domestic capacities to identify conserve and use genetic resources 
and better negotiate the terms of future agreements.
For the latter objective, it seems essential for developing countries to monitor 
experiences like the famous Merck-INBIO agreement. Under this deal, INBIO 
agreed to inventory and supply samples of plants, microorganisms and animals 
collected from the Costa Rican rain forests over a period of two years. The 
contract gave Merck & Co., Inc., the exclusive rights to screen, develop and 
patent new products from these resources. In return, Merck agreed to pay 
INBIO one million dollars and share five percent of the royalties arising from 
the sale of products derived from these biological materials. This agreement 
drew criticism from many different writers and policy analysts. The main 
criticism has been directed at the fact that INBIO is a private organization 
and therefore had no rights to lay claims to what is seen as national heritage 
(Menon 1995). Nevertheless, the agreement constitutes a first attempt to solve 
the problem of implementing effective economic compensation for access to 
the genetic resources of the South.
Another interesting example comes from another drug company, Shaman 
Pharmaceuticals. The company announced its intention to return a percentage 
of profits back to all countries and communities it has worked with after
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any product is commercialized. Compensation will be funneled through the 
Healing Forest Conservancy, a nonprofit organization founded by Shaman 
for the conservation of biodiversity and the protection of indigenous knowl-
edge. Shaman’s research has already led to some patents. The company 
recognizes that the resulting royalties are based upon its own contribution 
and that of the communities from whom it received medicinal plants. The 
company has developed contracts with some indigenous communities in 
Latin America. However, it could be some time before it will be possible to 
determine the benefit of the arrangement for the communities involved 
(Crucible Group 1994).
These two cases do not constitute models for developing countries to 
follow, but they have the merit of pioneering an non-exploited field. In my 
opinion, the worst position to adopt before the possibility of negotiating 
material transfer agreements of this nature is the paralysis from analysis.
Some institutions from developing countries are losing real opportunities 
because of their passive attitudes and the fear of losing the “treasure of 
biodiversity.” This attitude shows that these institutions are forgetting a 
basic mathematical truth: a small percentage of something is always greater 
than 100 percent of nothing.
RecognitionofFarmerV
ContributionstoBiodiversityandAgriculturalTechnology
Since the early 1980s, a part of the South-North controversy over genetic 
resources has centered on questions of equity in the distribution of benefits 
arising from the use of plant genetic resources. On one hand, developing 
countries have questioned the fairness of assigning intellectual property rights 
to those who breed new plant varieties, while the work of farmers who have 
generated the plant diversity that constitutes the basis for modern breeding 
is not legally recognized. On the other hand, industrialized countries have 
stressed that plant breeders’ rights and patents are not a form of compensation 
but rather an incentive for innovation (Jaffe and van Wijk 1995).
The contribution made by generations of farmers to the conservation 
of germplasm and the improvement of species has been recognized by the 
international community, particularly under the FAO International Undertaking 
on Plant Genetic Resources and the Convention on Biological Diversity. Indeed, 
the dispute was partly resolved when, within FAO, the rights of farmers in 
developing countries were acknowledged in order to counterbalance the plant 
breeders’ rights granted in industrialized countries. Farmers’ rights were 
defined as rights arising from contributions of farmers in generating plant 
genetic resources, particularly in the centers of diversity, and have the purpose 
of ensuring full benefits to these farmers and supporting the continuation of 
their contributions (FAO 1989). An International Gene Fund would be created 
to give a concrete and substantial basis to the farmers’ rights.
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But even when the farmers’ contribution to agricultural innovation is widely 
recognized1, the way of compensating this contribution remains in the dark. 
The International Gene Fund failed to materialize, although it had the merit 
of bringing the issue to the international political agenda. The concept was 
further discussed during the Keystone International Dialogue on Plant Genetic 
Resources (Keystone International Dialogue on Plant Genetic Resources 1991), 
and during the Earth Summit on Environment and Development in 1992.
The Convention, however, follows the principle of national patrimony and 
recognizes sovereign rights of States (Jade and van Wijk 1995). According 
to Menon (1995), it is essential to recognize not only the sovereignty but also 
the result of the work of many generations of peasants as a common contribu-
tion to innovation. For this reason, the implementation of FAO’s farmers’ rights 
concept should be given greater attention as a source of ideas to materialize 
the compensation to farmers.
Such rights were not conceived by the FAO Conference as an exclusive right, 
but as a right to obtain compensation (Correa, 1994). This fits the situation in 
which the rights are attributed not to individuals but to a collective entity, and 
to cases in which the administration of the remuneration is administered by a 
collective organization.
An example of implementation of farmers’ rights at the national level is 
contained in a draft law on plant varieties protection under review in India. 
According to this document, a National Community Gene Fund would be 
established. Its funding would be partly supplied by a royalty paid by the seed 
industry, based on the sales of protected varieties. The funds would be used in 
trust of Indian farmers for collecting, evaluating, upgrading, conserving and 
utilizing genetic diversity.
This approach at the national level is certainly an important step, constitut-
ing a collective compensating system with impacts in the long run on farmers’ 
communities. However, the collective mechanisms do not solve the problem of 
compensating farmers at the global level, given the global nature of the values 
of germplasm farmers provide (Correa 1994).
Internationally, it is essential that intergovernmental negotiations address 
the creation of a mandatory funding mechanism to recognize, reward and 
protect the contributions of local communities, farmers and indigenous people 
(Shand 1993). It has to be understood, however, that such a task will demand 
a change in the attitudes of negotiators, a greater amount of good will, and a 
lot of creativity.
‘In a recent survey conducted by the author, managers of Mexican seed companies were interviewed 
and their answer to an explicit question about the contribution of land races to their breeding 
programs states clearly the essential role of these resources. Company managers also agree that it is 
important to recognize farmers' contributions and even compensate them economically, but there is 
no agreement or new ideas on the way to do that.
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